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ABSTRACT  
The assumption that peacekeeping requires soldiers carrying weapons is widespread; 35 years of suc-
cessful peacekeeping by unarmed civilians is often overlooked. The original definition of peacekeep-
ing is being confused with peace enforcement and peace operations. Limited interest has led to under-
funding of unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) with fewer resources for both study and praxis. Mar-
ginalization of civilian peacekeeping has restricted the options for complex interventions; this reduced 
vision of peacekeeping is open to challenge in the light of evidence from the field. This paper first ex-
amines what is meant by peacekeeping and UCP. The relationship of UCP to nonviolence, feminism, 
and peace studies is considered. The constraints and limits of peacekeeping by armed military person-
nel during, or after, violent conflict are outlined. The core tasks of peacekeeping are analysed, and evi-
dence from the field is presented to show that these core tasks can be (and have been) successfully un-
dertaken by unarmed civilians for three decades, world-wide. The argument that armed military per-
sonnel are necessary, even essential, for peacekeeping is not supported by the evidence of civilian suc-
cess in undertaking the core tasks. The paper ends with conclusions and a call for a new paradigm for 
peacekeeping.  
Paper 
 
In mid-2014, women living in the Benitu Protection of Civilians area in South Sudan alerted the 
unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) team living there that women going out to gather firewood 
and water were being raped, and sometimes gang-raped, by soldiers. The women reported that 
the soldiers would sometimes describe the assaults as part of their job. Often, older women took 
on these chores to protect the younger ones, and decrease the likelihood of attack. Women had 
to choose between their personal safety and providing for their families’ basic needs. The UCP 
team began accompanying women when they left the camp, sending two or more trained civilian 
protectors to be visible and patrol along with the women. In the year after this accompaniment 
was offered no woman was attacked when accompanied. The unarmed civilians had protected 
the women from direct harm and violence by armed men. 
 
This paper examines the widely held underlying assumptions that peacekeeping requires (i) mil-
itary personnel, and furthermore (ii) the military peacekeepers need to carry weapons if the 
peacekeeping is going to work. Evidence is presented to show that for at least 35 years, unarmed 
civilian peacekeepers have been successfully protecting civilians and supporting the building of 
peaceful environments through both traditional and new peacekeeping tasks. 
 
A false paradigm has emerged over recent years which assumes the presence of armed military 
peacekeepers (AMP) is necessary for peacekeeping operations as well as for peace enforcement. 
Peacekeeping by unarmed civilian peacekeepers (UCP) has not been reported to the same extent, 
nor been the subject of the same level of research as AMP (albeit there are far greater numbers 
of AMP missions than UCP projects).  
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The reasons for sidelining UCP include the need to understand the power of example and per-
suasion compared with the power of strength and force; without this understanding the idea 
that unarmed civilians could make a difference and change the behaviour of armed actors in a 
situation of violent conflict or recent conflict can indeed appear unlikely. Moreover, reporting of 
peacekeeping, for example on UN websites, has largely focussed on the activities with titles like 
“What we did?”1 and not been based on identifying the results of the activities in terms of longer-
term outcomes (behaviour, attitude and decision making changes by those influenced by the 
peacekeeping actions) and the resulting impact (societal level changes - usually the intended 
benefits for those affected). Reporting based on cost, number of external people involved, or the 
aspirations of an international mandate, has a strong tendency to overlook the low cost, local, 
and often fragmented actions of UCP.  
 
This paper is a literature-assessment project that draws on previous research work document-
ing the development of UCP2 including both theoretical work and case studies. This literature not 
only allows us to examine UCP but, by inserting it into the existing peacekeeping domain, allows 
us to contribute to a greater understanding of how peacekeeping works. In this paper we make a 
distinction between armed military peacekeeping (AMP) which is taken to include both military 
personnel and other uniformed and armed professionals (such as police or military advisors ac-
companied by armed protection), and unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP). AMP includes, for 
example, missions by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), African Union 
(AU), and private military personnel, and is currently the most common type of peacekeeping.  
 
The very few examples of completely unarmed military contingents3 or local civilian militias tak-
ing on a clear peacekeeping role, are not included. This paper argues that UCP shows that a 
wider range of peacekeeping approaches is possible, not that UCP is the only alternative to AMP.  
 
A large part of the published information about peacekeeping and peace operations missions4 is 
based on missions authorised and managed by the UN, and more recently other military mis-
sions such as those of the African Union. Reporting only armed interventions supports the un-
stated assumption that peacekeeping requires an armed military force, whether or not it is a UN 
operation. UN operations are well publicised and the information is available online. In compari-
son, UCP is usually carried out by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Peace Bri-
gades International (PBI) or Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), and civilian agencies such as the Or-
ganisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The documentation from NGOs gener-
ally remains internal and confidential, which limits access for researchers. 
 
This paper is not arguing that there is no role for the military in peacekeeping, in some cases the 
“uniformed and armed” approach to peacekeeping may be required.5 The conceptual model pro-
posed is that (a) military (or uniformed) personnel, and (b) the availability and use of lethal 
weapons, are not universally essential for peacekeeping. Furthermore, the use of military per-
sonnel and weapons creates problems in managing violence and conflict while building a sus-
tainable peace, not least the documented loss of substantial amounts of weapons, ammunition 
                                                 
1 UN April 2017  
2 Weber 1993; Moser-Puangsuwan 1996; Booth and Smithey 2007; Coy 1993; Coy 1997; Mahony 
and Eguren 1997; Schirch 2006; Schweitzer 2001. Others more recent are cited in this paper. 
3 Gehrmann et al 2015 
4 ZIF 2016; CIC 2016; Ramsbotham et al 2015; Bellamy and Williams 2010 
5 Ramsbotham et al 2015:187; Curran and Woodhouse 2007 
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and other materiel that then fuel the conflict.6 Even though unarmed civilians are less likely to be 
killed than armed military peacekeepers,7 the problems arising from AMP have not been ade-
quately studied or understood, in part because AMP is tacitly accepted as the only available ap-
proach. False assumptions like: “if there is violence then you need soldiers”, or “peacekeeping is 
a military activity” have crept in.  
 
This paper first explores what underlines, in literature and practice, armed military peacekeeping and 
UCP, and suggests that the original definition of peacekeeping has become conflated with peace en-
forcement, a change that could be hidden by use of the term “peace operations”. The relationship of 
UCP to nonviolence, peace studies and feminism is discussed and the constraints and limits of peace-
keeping by armed military personnel during, or after, violent conflict are outlined. The core tasks of 
traditional peacekeeping are analysed, and evidence from the field is presented to show that these core 
tasks can be (and have been) successfully undertaken by unarmed civilians for more than three dec-
ades, world-wide. The evidence of civilian success in undertaking the core tasks of peacekeeping is 
analysed and conclusions presented. 
 
Peacekeeping: definition 
Peacekeeping does not have a single overall agreed theoretical basis.8 The current working defi-
nition of peacekeeping has drifted away from the original definition, which Schweitzer describes 
as ‘to control potential perpetrators of violence so that they “at least stop destroying things, oth-
ers, and themselves”9 this is the meaning of peacekeeping.’10 
 
The five principles from the original conception of peacekeeping are:11 
1. Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission; 
2. Non-use of force except in self-defence; 
3. Voluntary contribution of troop contingents from smaller, neutral countries or middle 
powers;  
4. Impartiality; 
5. Day-to-day control of the operation by the Secretary-General. 
These five principles were laid down by then UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Canadian 
diplomat Lester Pearson. 12 
 
The tasks of “traditional” or “conventional” peacekeeping13 include communication and negotia-
tion with armed actors, presence and proactive presence, interpositioning, monitoring and ob-
serving, early warning/early response, capacity building and security. In this paper the available 
evidence is used to argue these tasks can be, and are, successfully implemented by unarmed ci-
vilians. 
 
A new paradigm has emerged by default and without sufficient discussion or rigorous evalua-
tion. Galtung's original definition of peacekeeping as the prevention and reduction of direct vio-
lence, when he said “the intention is to ‘keep the peace’, meaning maintaining absence of direct 
                                                 
6 Berman, Racovita and Schroeder 2017 
7 Janzen 2014 
8 Pugh 2003:104-112; Bellamy and Williams 2004; Ogunrotifa, Ayodeji Bayo 2011 
9  Galtung 1996:103 cited in Schweitzer 2010 
10  Schweitzer 2010 
11  See Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:xi 
12 Schweitzer 2010 
13  Ramsbotham et al 2015; Bellamy and Williams 2010; and Newby 2016 
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violence. By that method ‘time is gained’ ”14 has gradually shifted to a definition more in line with 
current UN missions. The term ‘peacekeeping’ is now shorthand for peacekeeping as an activity 
undertaken by armed uniformed personnel working under military-style command-and-control 
structures with authority to use lethal force in self-defence. AMP uses weapons, and the point of 
having weapons is to be able to force people to do something they don't want to do. UCP pro-
vides a route through which the term ‘peacekeeping’ can be interrogated in order to reveal the 
hidden assumptions within it, and thus allow the creation of new theories and approaches. 
 
In Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Maill the authors define three modes of peacekeeping, related 
to the stages of the conflict.15 The phases identified are (i) preventing the escalation of violence 
to all-out war, “Prevention”, (ii) limiting the intensity and spread of war, “Limitation” and (iii) 
consolidating a ceasefire and creating space for reconstruction, “Stabilization”. In this article, the 
term “peacekeeping” refers to activities that directly prevent or reduce violence, or create a safer 
environment for civilians; simply completing the activities regardless of the results is not the 
goal. 
 
Peacekeeping is neither conflict resolution nor peacebuilding, it does not seek a specific solution 
nor support a particular side in the conflict; peacekeeping in this definition is impartial. Impar-
tiality is not consistently defined in the literature. Schweitzer says that peacekeeping 
[...] seeks to help implement an agreement made by the conflict sides, or to protect and 
uphold matters of international law (e.g. protection of civilians). [...] there are also groups 
that focus on protection, but who consciously seek to support one side in a conflict in its 
struggle. They usually argue that in extremely asymmetrical power situations there can 
be no nonpartisanship. Perhaps the best examples are the various international groups 
and projects currently active in Palestine, such as the International Solidarity Move-
ment.”16  
 
Schweitzer suggests this model for understanding impartiality. 
 
Figure  1. Objectives of civilian peacekeeping (Schweitzer, Civilian Peacekeeping 13)17  
 
                                                 
14 Galtung 1976:283 
15  Ramsbotham et al 2015:173 
16  Schweitzer 2010 
17  Schweitzer 2010:13 
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Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Maill recognise that the use of the broad term ‘peace operations’ 
has blurred the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Taking an example from 
Mali, these authors note that the peacekeeping intervention included counter-terrorism and 
counter-insurgency which ‘may be seen to remove such operations even further from the stand-
ard practices of peacekeeping.’18 Peace enforcement concerns activities, usually immediately 
prior to peacekeeping, where force or armed force is used to reduce or end violent engagement. 
Without consent, activities are, correctly, peace enforcement not peacekeeping and in the en-
forcement phase weapons and military force may indeed be required.  
 
Security itself, usually a key component of a mission mandate in peacekeeping,19 is a contested 
area in the literature. While state military security and militarisation still dominate, new think-
ing about security20 has opened it up to include areas related to the security of individuals and 
communities, protection of civilians, and human security. The first principles of security are 
“freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity”,21 but this is in contrast 
to the way in which states seek security through military spending and military alliances. For ex-
ample 'The UK’s "determination to remain one of the most important powers on the interna-
tional stage", as Malcolm Chalmers at the Royal United Services Institute has said [...], powerfully 
shapes security policy.'22  
 
                                                 
18 Ramsbotham et al. 2015:185 
19 UN no date 
20 The Ammerdown Group 2016 
21 UN General Assembly 2005:143 cited in The Ammerdown Group 2016:8 
22 The Ammerdown Group 2016 
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Booth and Smithey describe how UCP is aligned with human security, in contrast to the state fo-
cus on national security, force projection and maintaining national interests.23 The Ammerdown 
Group argue that security strategy employed to deal with current threats is the same interven-
tion policy that has been largely ineffective, and propose new security thinking, which parallels 
the proposal for new peacekeeping thinking in this paper.  
 
UCP cannot step completely outside the state security system. Coy24 argues that UCP still needs 
work visas and permission to work, and shows how privilege plays a role when UCP relies on 
people from wealthy developed countries not being targeted (which was more the case in Sri 
Lanka than Mindanao, so privilege is also contextual). In Mindanao UCP took on a formal cease-
fire monitoring role in the peace agreement. With an official role in the ceasefire, UCP staff 
worked at the highest national level directly communicating with the leaders of the armed actors 
through the ceasefire agreement. The UCP country director in Philippines was able to contact 
leaders of the armed actors at any time and influenced armed actors to remain in their barracks 
after rumours that they were about to attack, showing how UCP can work within the security 
system. 
 
The change in meaning from “traditional peacekeeping” to the UN paradigm of AMP within 
broader peace operations has not been rigorously assessed on the basis of evidence, indeed the 
assumption that weapons are required in peacekeeping has been relatively unchallenged. Peace-
keeping needs a rethink. 
 
Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: definition 
This paper now examines how UCP matches the different descriptions of peacekeeping in the ex-
isting literature on peacekeeping, peace studies, feminism and nonviolence. 
 
UCP is a descriptive term for a range of activities based on a set of common principles:  
1. Nonviolence is the underpinning principle, weapons are neither carried nor used.  
2. The work of peacekeeping is done by civilians, rather than military personnel without weap-
ons. 
3. The ‘primacy of the local’ guides actions. Peacekeeping organisations do not arrive with an 
agenda set externally, nor bring their own “solutions” to the “problem”, but identify resources 
and solutions located in the area and among the people who live there. The exact definition and 
boundary of “local” is contested in the literature, but a “local” focus is clearly different from ex-
ternal organisations working either without the participation of local people, or without consult-
ing them. 
 
The name unarmed civilian peacekeeping, UCP, is used in this article to provide a descriptive 
overarching term to identify a field of study rather than to define or constrain the practices of 
organisations. The terms practitioners use for UCP include: peace teams, accompaniment, un-
armed civilian protection and third party nonviolent intervention.25 The different terms are used 
to identify and define the specific focus or approach of different organisations. 
 
UCP has been variously defined as: "the prevention of direct violence through influence or con-
trol of the behaviour of potential perpetrators by unarmed civilians who are deployed on the 
                                                 
23 Booth and Smithey 2007 
24 Coy 1993 
25 Julian and Schweitzer 2015 
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ground"; "activities by civilians to prevent or reduce violence so as to make it safe for others to 
engage in peacebuilding activities"; and "efforts by unarmed civilian third parties, in the field, to 
prevent or diminish violence by influencing or controlling potential perpetrators for the purpose 
of protecting people and making it safe for local people to engage in peace and justice efforts."26 
More expansively, UCP  
[…] is the practice of deploying unarmed civilians before, during, and after violent con-
flict, to prevent or reduce violence, to provide direct physical protection to other civilians, 
and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures. The purpose of UCP is to 
create a safer environment, or a ‘safer space’, for civilians to address their own needs, 
solve their own conflicts, and protect vulnerable individuals and populations in their 
midst.27 
Identifying UCP as an emancipatory, normative and democratic response to dealing with violent 
conflict places it within the domain of peace studies. Rather than being a purely theoretical ap-
proach, this paper shows that civilian peacekeeping is a concrete, real and proven peacekeeping 
method. Directly responding to human rights abuses is at the core of all UCP work. For example, 
in Guatemala, and Colombia, UCP teams documented human rights abuses and specifically pro-
tected human rights defenders; PBI does this everywhere they work, including Aceh, and Colom-
bia; and the Balkan Peace Team also responded to human rights abuses. 
 
One of the most important features of UCP is that it is rooted in nonviolence theory.28 In this con-
text nonviolence is the active engagement and involvement of trained people, utilising the power 
of communication, relationships and of “being observed” to change the behaviour of armed ac-
tors without the threat or use of force. Nonviolence is one of the principles of UCP29 and is a 
growing field of study providing credible evidence of the efficacy of nonviolence. Chenoweth and 
Stephan showed that nonviolence is twice as likely as violence to work in securing large scale so-
cial change,30 and Bartkowski demonstrated the breadth of use of nonviolence across the world 
that has largely gone unnoticed or unrecognised.31 While UCP does not require participants to be 
pacifist, it does follow the line of pacifist thought and argument which questions the assumptions 
that: violence solves problems, violence can effectively halt violence, or that military personnel 
are legitimate actors to intervene. 
 
Nonviolence is, however, a contested concept - the biggest division is between principled and 
pragmatic. Schweitzer identified this model as the Pragmatic-principled dimension (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 The Pragmatic-Principled dimension.32 
 
Table: The pragmatic-principled dimension 
Criterion Pragmatic nonviolence Principled nonviolence 
Nature of commitment Most effective Ethically best 
                                                 
26 Schweitzer 2010:9; Wallis 2010; Furnari 2014:38 
28 Oldenhuis 2015 
28 Schweitzer 2001; Julian and Schweitzer 2015 
29 Schweitzer 2010; Furnari 2016 
30 Chenoweth and Stephan 2011 
31 Bartkowski 2013; see also Mosuer-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000; Schirch 2006; Mahony and 
Eguren 1997 
32 Schweitzer 2001:8 
 8 
Means and end Separate: ends justify means, but 
also: nonviolence means may be used 
for unjust ends (Goss-Mayr) 
Indivisible 
Approach to conflict Incompatible interests Shared problem 
Approach to opponent Gain victory over him, if necessary 
by coercion 
Convince him, if necessary by ac-
cepting own suffering 
Nonviolence as way of life? Not necessarily  Probably 
 
Burrowes 1996:100 modified by Christine Schweitzer. 
 
 
Booth and Smithey discuss ways in which UCP has a relationship with nonviolent resistance.33 
Using nonviolence means that UCP teams need discipline and commitment to nonviolence in the 
way they live, work, speak and act. Groups who practice UCP all explicitly commit to being 
wholly nonviolent, meaning they use it in principled manner, although there is a pragmatic rea-
son for using it - because it works as an effective method of protecting people. An example was 
the provision by PBI of protection to many key human rights and social justice activists during 
the Guatemalan civil war.34 After the end of the conflict, a number of the people who had been 
protected were elected to government, or provided key leadership in organisations that engaged 
in significant peacebuilding work.  
 
Nonviolence is not only the absence of violence or weapons; active nonviolence implies ways of 
designing and implementing projects that are different from mainstream humanitarian work. As 
a result, UCP projects are less likely to be co-opted to the methods of international humanitarian 
and peacebuilding “industries” than AMP.35 Pugh and Cunliffe both discuss the ways peacekeep-
ing can reinforce or maintain imperialism and the status quo.36 This paper shows how nonvio-
lence is actively offering an alternative to AMP, and also to the challenges posed by the liberal 
imperialism of international aid and peacebuilding systems. 
 
UCP is not a new concept and has been used for at least three decades,37 but has not been widely 
studied. The literature on peacekeeping has frequently marginalised the potential of UCP,38 even 
when that potential has been demonstrated in other contexts.39 The absence of reporting of the 
potential - and the success - of UCP cannot be construed as evidence that UCP is ineffective. 
 
UCP theory does not directly fit into the way in which the development of peacekeeping is de-
scribed in large sections of the peacekeeping literature,40 even where there is a focus on tradi-
tional peacekeeping (with the criterion of consent). In Bellamy and Williams (2010), while dis-
                                                 
33 Booth and Smithey 2007 
34 Mahoney and Eguren 1987 
36 Barnett et al 2014; Autessere 2014b 
36 Pugh 2004; Cunliffe 2013 
37 Mahony and Eguren 1997; Schweitzer 2001; Furnari 2016 
38 Ramsbotham et al 2015 
39 Schweitzer 2001 
40 Ramsbotham at al 2015:192; Bellamy and Williams 2010 
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cussing preventive deployments, the authors specifically exclude civilian activities and only dis-
cuss the deployment of “uniformed personnel (soldiers, military observers, and police)”.41 Rams-
botham, Woodhouse and Maill mention UCP as part of their exploration of critical peacekeeping 
studies. Critical peacekeeping theory suggests that new forms of democratic peacekeeping will 
emerge42 and “mention is made of purely civilian peacekeepers”43 who emerged from the “third 
sector”, i.e. UCP is outside state and UN control. Dismissing UCP because it is a third sector ap-
proach, or marginalising UCP by failing to report its successes, ignores a body of evidence. These 
long-term successes, evident in multiple situations (see Table 1) create a pathway for critical 
peacekeeping studies to engage with the challenges of complex contemporary violent conflicts. 
For example, in Georgia a UCP team worked with villages on the disputed border to increase se-
curity, and build local early warning and response mechanisms. The team worked to limit the 
trigger effects of border violations in the conflict, and enabled villagers to create micro-security 
agreements about the movement of livestock and commemoration.44 
 
UCP raises criticisms of conventional peacekeeping research for not challenging the assumed use 
of military and weapons. The use of military force is, however, challenged in peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation literature, and the use of UCP draws on the transformative approaches of 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution, and local peacebuilding.45 This paper places the UCP ap-
proach within critical peacekeeping theory, although the practice of UCP, as will be shown, is 
based on the same tasks “on the ground” as traditional peacekeeping. The focus on the “local” 
places UCP within emancipatory thinking and transformative approaches as outlined by Leder-
ach and Curle.46 
 
When commenting on the 2012 ZIF report,47 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Maill wondered if a 
cosmopolitan peacekeeping future could be attained,48 and also suggested that emancipatory ap-
proaches are the follow on from the critique of cosmopolitan peacekeeping. UCP presents an op-
tion for future peacekeeping that fits a more radical critique than those of Pugh, Cunliffe, and 
Bellamy and Williams.49 Cunliffe describes UN peacekeeping as “the highest form of liberal impe-
rialism”50 but UCP steps outside the boundaries of state and therefore provides a way of analys-
ing peacekeeping outside traditional state and UN structures. 
 
This paper proposes that UCP is a more radical embodiment of emancipatory peacekeeping51 
and the beginnings of recognition are in the 2014 High Level Panel report on Peace Operations52 
where “unarmed strategies” are included as important.53 
 
                                                 
41 Bellamy and Williams 2010:155 
42 Pugh 2004:53-4 
43 Ramsbotham et al. 2015:193 
44 Julian and Furnari 2013 
45 Francis 2013; Fetherstone 1994; Lederach 1997; Lederach and Lederach 2011; Paffenholz 
2014; MacGinty and Richmond 2013; Furnari et al 2015 
46 Lederach 2011, Curle 1996 
47 ZIF 2016 
48 Ramsbotham et al. 2015:197 
49 Pugh 2004; Cunliffe 2013; Bellamy and Williams 2004 
50 Cunliffe 2013 
51 Richmond 2007 
52 UN 2015a 
53 UN 2015a 
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Civilian peacekeeping sees the provision of security as its central task and does not engage in de-
velopment work. UCP builds relationships with the clear intention of placing local needs at the 
centre of their work, they do not need to engage in a benefactor role through humanitarian aid 
distribution in order to engage with local communities.  
 
Feminist approaches have also looked at nonviolent methods and tools in response to violence.54 
Feminism challenges the patriarchal values that underpin a reliance on the military and high-
lights its damaging impact. UCP, in its rejection of militarism, is aligned with the alternative vi-
sion of peace and security in feminist approaches, and recognises the significance of gender in 
peacekeeping activities. UCP can make it easier for women to get their issues addressed. For ex-
ample, in Sri Lanka, a UCP team enabled negotiation between a group of women and the military 
who had just abducted their children; the children were returned to the women.55 Although most 
UCP teams actively seek diversity and gender balance, two examples of women only teams are 
"The Women’s Peace Service"56 and "South Sudan Women’s Peacekeeping Teams”.57 
 
There is a difference between unarmed peacekeeping where it is the military who are unarmed 
and UCP by civilians using nonviolence, without military culture or training. There are civilians 
who serve in UN military peacekeeping missions, but the available data suggest they are in sup-
porting roles within a military mission, and are therefore not UCP in the definition used above.58  
 
In contemporary complex violent conflicts, and in the context of most peacekeeping missions, 
not all the armed actors will have reached full agreement, nor will they all be disarmed and pre-
pared to become part of the peace process - if indeed there is one. Thus, the distinction between 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping is often blurred. UCP missions have included projects in areas 
where, although some, or many, of the armed actors have agreed to stay in barracks, desist from 
attacks, or disarm, there are also armed actors who have continued to be active (examples in-
clude Mindanao, South Sudan, Colombia and Myanmar). In these cases UCP has still been shown 
to be able to protect civilians and change the behaviour of armed actors.59  
The AMP principle of "non-use of force except in self defence and defence of the mandate" and 
the concept of "robust peacekeeping" are important dividing principles between AMP and UCP. 
In UCP the guiding principles are nonviolence and the primacy of the local.60  
 
The understanding of consent is one of the key differences between UN AMP missions and NGO 
UCP missions. Top-down formal consent through a state and UN system, with an agreement 
made through high-level and frequently remote accords, is in direct contrast to UCP which devel-
ops formal or informal consent at a national and, crucially, a local level through the development 
of trusting and strong relationships with both armed and peace actors in the conflict.61  
Limitations of AMP compared to UCP  
 
There has been insufficient attention given to the analysis of both the strengths and the concur-
                                                 
54 McAllister 1983; Hutchings and Frazer 2014; Enloe 2001 
55 Schweitzer 2009 
56 IWPS n.d.  
57 NP 2017  
58 White and Julian 2017 
59 Julian 2017 
60 Julian and Schweitzer 2015 
61 Furnari 2012; Furnari 2014 
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rent limitations of AMP, especially in comparison to UCP. As already noted in this paper, this as-
sertion is based on peacekeeping in the original sense, not peace enforcement, nor broader 
peace operations. The evidence suggests several disadvantages of AMP when compared to UCP. 
The disadvantages become more apparent when peacekeeping is evaluated on the results 
achieved (outcomes and impacts) instead of the level of activity and resources used.  
 
Peacekeeping necessarily happens in places where there are high levels of violence, but also 
where there is willingness and interest by at least some actors to secure a safer and more peace-
ful space. Deploying a military peacekeeping team, with weapons, exemplifies a strategy that vio-
lence can only be prevented by the threat or use of further violence. Evidence from Elworthy and 
Rifkind, as well as interviews with military peacekeepers shows that not just the use of weapons 
but the threat of violence by peacekeepers tends to reinforce the cycle of violence.62  
 
Civilian leadership is a core element of constructing a lasting peace, but the authority and ability 
of armed peacekeepers to overrule local civilian leaders reinforces a lower status for the civilian 
leadership. UCP of necessity works with, and through, local leadership. One example of local un-
armed leadership was the Mindanao Ceasefire and Peace agreement in 2009 where civilians, us-
ing UCP, were assigned responsibility for civilian protection and ceasefire monitoring in local 
communities. The unarmed civilian peacekeepers had a clear, legitimate role validated by recog-
nition from both armed and civilian actors.63  Another example comes from Bougainville (Papua 
New Guinea), where the ceasefire agreement required that all supporting international interven-
tions must be unarmed. Some of the peacekeepers were military, some police and some civilians, 
but the Bougainville Revolutionary Army believed that to de-escalate the violence and to pro-
mote peace, it was necessary to eschew new military presence.64 
 
Local ownership of solutions is essential if they are to succeed, but military peacekeeping struc-
tures generally exclude or diminish local ownership in solution-finding, making a transition to 
long-term locally-led peacebuilding slower.65 The understanding of the context and require-
ments for effective and sustainable peacebuilding has developed over the past 20 years to in-
clude the recognition that inclusion and ownership by the local population are essential .66 Alt-
hough military peacekeeping teams meet with local people, command-and-control military 
structures, very often with links to an international decision-making process, generally do not 
allow local people to determine the focus or goals of the peacekeeping team they interact with. 
Even when the intention is to include local input, there is significant evidence that this is poorly 
understood and implemented.67 As a result, when peacekeeping hands over to, or works at the 
same time as, peacebuilding actors (who are, by contrast, overwhelmingly civilian) there may be 
little or no relationship between the peacekeeping mission and the local initiatives, perhaps al-
ready underway, that are required to build a sustainable peace. Pugh shows how the rescuer-vic-
tim model is reinforced where "innocent and helpless women and children are projected as vis-
ual emblems of crisis"68 and this is used in the justification of peace enforcement and AMP. An 
alternative non-militarised model would include local civilians as participants and leaders, and 
recognise the agency of local people in the process of building peace and creating security. 
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Where local leadership is opposed to some part of a national or international agenda or agree-
ment, the contribution of AMP may be perceived as negative because it is mandated to imple-
ment a distant agenda. Civilian peacekeeping is currently carried out principally by smaller In-
ternational NGOs who are largely independent of the agendas of global powers and large multi-
lateral institutions69 and are not trying to implement them.  
 
There can be a very significant difference between AMP and UCP as to how accessible peace-
keepers are to local people. Military peacekeepers usually live in separate barracks and are often 
rotated on short to medium tours of duty, limiting the trust and relationship building that can 
take place. Janzen argues that AMP staff have a mortality rate 12 times higher than UCP staff70 
which reinforces the view that separate accommodation with a defensible perimeter barrier is 
required for peacekeepers.  Separation and barriers reduce accessibility to peacekeepers by local 
people. By contrast, civilian peacekeepers live and work in houses in the affected communities - 
shopping at the local shops and market, visiting local villages and religious and community lead-
ers, meeting with local police and military commanders. Civilian peacekeepers are required to 
integrate, to learn at least a minimum level of the local language, and to understand and respect 
local customs. In contrast to the “external” model of AMP, civilian peacekeeping teams require 
acceptance of their presence by the local actors in order to function effectively and securely:71 
the team cannot retreat to a base with a secure perimeter.  
 
Local civilian ceasefire monitors (using UCP) are often particularly valuable in that they notice, 
or are informed by neighbours, about worrisome changes immediately – including subtle 
changes that might go unnoticed by military personnel from a foreign country, isolated in a bar-
racks, without knowledge of the local language, customs and culture. Civilians are likely to hear 
rumours and can be well-placed to investigate and de-escalate before retaliation for perceived 
injustices has begun.  One example is the Mindanao Ceasefire and Peace agreement in 2009, 
where joint international and local civilian teams lived and worked in the affected communities. 
As a result the civilian ceasefire monitors could be easily contacted, and they could respond 
quickly to the need to monitor escalating situations, negotiate pauses in fighting to allow civil-
ians to evacuate, and investigate incidents.72  Another example comes from Sri Lanka, where one 
NP field site was asked by a group of mothers for accompaniment when they went to request the 
return of their abducted children. The UCP team immediately accompanied the women to the 
gates of the compound where they believed the children had been taken. Instead of threatening 
the women, the armed actors let them wait and restate their request, and by the end of the day 
the children were released. The next time there was an abduction, the women were more confi-
dent to go by themselves. In a further example, the presence of UCP providing international ac-
companiment in San Jose de Apartado, Colombia, contributed to a decrease in violent attacks, in 
part because of their continual presence.73 
 
The limitation of access to, and by, local people has also been noted by AMP staff. One high-level 
military leader who had served in several peacekeeping missions noted he was more able to con-
nect with people when he was an unarmed observer, then when armed.  
 
When I used to go to the villages [...] people do not prefer to see a stranger approaching to 
                                                 
69  Julian and Schweitzer 2015 
70 Janzen 2014 
71 Schweitzer 2010; Furnari 2016 
72 Furnari 2016a 
73 Lindsay-Poland 2016 
 13 
you, an armed stranger approaching to you, a stranger with a weapon. When I had no 
weapons, I could access people, people had confidence at the first sight… People used to 
welcome us more, but if you are there with a weapon, you are looked at in a different way. 
People used to think about it before talking with you. But without a weapon we have 
more, military observers have more access. Which is very true, that is what I have found 
myself.74  
 
Many places where peacekeeping teams are working (either military or civilian) are highly mili-
tarised societies where military force projection is accepted as normal,75 and this is reinforced 
by adding a further military presence with weapons through AMP. A high degree of militarisa-
tion requires the reallocation of resources from social purposes such as health and education to 
fund the military. South Sudan continues to fund a civil war while providing very little in the way 
of education or health services, is just one example. In many militarised countries, the military 
have taken on additional powers or roles. Where armed conflict occurs, peaceful actors and non-
violent conflict processes have often been marginalised in favour of military approaches. As 
Francis has consistently pointed out, this provides a perverse incentive to be an armed actor and 
to maintain a level of violence, in order to be included in the future benefits of a peace process. 
By contrast, with nonviolence at its heart, UCP demonstrates a model that challenges militarism 
and supports civil society76. 
 
As they live in the community, UCP staff are continuously observed. Of necessity, they build rela-
tionships with people with different perspectives on, and roles in, the conflict. The actions of UCP 
staff, and their interactions with local people can provide an important opportunity for local peo-
ple to develop the knowledge and skills required for peacebuilding, and for UCP staff to gain in-
sight into traditional norms for addressing conflict. Paying attention to, and showing apprecia-
tion for, traditional norms for addressing conflict nonviolently can encourage and invigorate 
their use. This opportunity is largely absent in the case of AMP staff.  One person who reflected 
on the UCP work in South Sudan suggested that perhaps the most important contribution was 
the training and support to a number of South Sudanese who, long after NP leaves, would still be 
committed to nonviolence and working with others to address conflicts nonviolently.77   Even 
where there is no traditional conflict resolution, UCP encourages debate and development of 
nonviolent responses, which underpins conflict resolution, local peacebuilding, human rights 
and peaceful social change. The basis of nonviolent methods is good relationships, inclusivity 
and tolerance.78  
 
The issues of gender and peacekeeping include not only discrimination but even cases of direct 
sexual exploitation by peacekeepers. Women who have experienced sexual abuse and rape in 
war do not want to see more armed male soldiers. The UN have made efforts to recruit more 
women to peacekeeping missions, but since there are few serving military personnel who are 
women and able to serve from the  Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the vast majority of 
peacekeepers are men. UCP recruits teams with a better gender balance and greater diversity. 
The UCP team itself can demonstrate good gender relations between male and female staff, who 
may also be able to access different actors and communities. 
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The Core Tasks of Peacekeeping 
By returning to the original definition of peacekeeping with its core principles, it is possible to 
explore how peacekeeping can be delivered either by military personnel or by civilians. To do 
this, the main tasks of peacekeepers must first be identified. The list in Table 1 results from com-
bining the descriptions on the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UND-
PKO), the description by Newby from the United Nations Interim force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and 
the work of Furnari following her interviews with frontline peacekeepers including military, po-
lice and unarmed civilians.79  
 
If analysis of the tasks, supported by evidence from the field (Table 1), shows that unarmed civil-
ians can also successfully undertake these tasks, then there will be a case for UCP, and peace-
keeping in general, that works outside military structures and methods.  
 
A key challenge of defining specific tasks that are successfully performed by UCP, or by AMP, is 
that there is no established metric for “success” in terms of outcomes and societal level impacts. 
Nor is there agreement on how to identify the causal links between peacekeeper presence or ac-
tivity, armed actors changing their behaviour, and any subsequent improvements to daily life for 
local people. UCP is not claiming that all violence and armed actors can be stopped through the 
tasks of peacekeeping, but neither can AMP make this claim. Claims that the presence and activi-
ties of peacekeepers will automatically lead to an improvement in the lives of local people are 
open to challenge unless cause and effect can be demonstrated. There is some empirical evi-
dence to support the view that UCP can change the behaviour of armed actors and prevent vio-
lence.80 
  
While the debates about the theory and principles of peacekeeping have changed in the last 50 
years, the activities and tasks of peacekeeping have not changed in substance. The mandates 
now include the protection of civilians and human rights, but peacekeepers still patrol, monitor 
and provide presence to deter violence.81 Security sector reform is sometimes included as a task 
of peacekeeping, however among civilians it is more usually carried out by peacebuilding organi-
sations. 
 
The body of knowledge referenced includes work done to define and describe the field in both 
published and unpublished literature, NP and PBI evaluations from field projects that have been 
made publicly available, and websites from the organisations in Figure 2. One of the challenges 
of research in this field is the limitation of the dataset. Much of the material that could be used 
for case studies is contained within confidential or team reports; only where these have been 
made public are they included. 
The table of evidence 
 
The first column shows the task, the second column lists examples from UCP and the third col-
umn is the organisation involved. The intention is to demonstrate that many of the tasks associ-
ated with peacekeeping can be done by both AMP and UCP. The majority of the data are from PBI 
and NP in the last 35 years, primarily because these have been the two largest organisations and, 
as Schweitzer notes,82 they share the view of ‘impartiality’ that most closely fits traditional 
peacekeeping. The tasks have been grouped by type and the analysis will identify the ways in 
                                                 
79 Newby 2016; Furnari 2014 
80 Oldenhuis 2015 
81 Bellamy and Williams 2010:175; UN n.d. 
82 Schweitzer 2001 
 15 
which UCP includes traditional peacekeeping tasks.  
 
TABLE 1 
Table 1. The choice of organisations used for this table is determined by publicly available data 
from the publications cited; it is not exhaustive of all UCP organisations. 
 
Task description Reference where it is used in UCP Which organisa-
tions are in-
volved?  
Presence, patrolling, protection, influencing behaviour 
Presence - the patrolling 
and being visible in areas 
affected by violence, or 
where violence may oc-
cur 
Sri Lanka , South Sudan, Colombia,  
Palestine where their interviews indi-
cated the 'necessity of wide, consistent, 
presence'. 
Mindanao where it is under 'proactive 
engagement'i 
 
NP 
CPT, Fellowship of 
Reconciliation 
(FoR), Swedish FoR 
(SweFoR) 
PBI 
EAPPI 
Patrol disputed lines - mi-
cro security agreements 
Georgia working with villages on the dis-
puted border. 
Colombia and the peace zones and vil-
lages. 
NP 
FoR 
PBI 
Protect civilians. In Colombia the protection is often from 
state violence (or state tacit approval of 
violence) and in Sri Lanka children were 
prevented from being abducted through 
presence 
Mindanao, South Sudan included protect-
ing women from rape through proactive 
presence and accompaniment.ii 
 
PBI 
NP 
Change behavior of 
armed actors - this can be 
that they stop or limit 
some part of previous be-
haviour 
For example in South Sudan and Colom-
bia, UCP has prevented killing and disap-
pearances by armed actors through their 
presence and accompaniment.iii  
 
NP 
PBI 
Monitoring, observing, informing 
Monitoring and Reporting 
mechanisms for resolving 
disputes 
For example, in Sri Lanka and Colombia 
communities are supported to get in-
volved 
in creating safe spaces and opportunities 
for peaceful dispute resolution, including 
shuttle diplomacy and bringing parties 
together.iv 
NP 
PBI 
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Monitor and observe 
peace processes in post 
conflict areas 
In Mindanao, Myanmar, Bourganville, 
and in OSCE missions such as Kosovo, un-
armed 
peacekeepers have been monitoring 
ceasefires and peace processes Minda-
nao. 
OSCE long-term missions.v 
NP 
OSCE 
New Zealand mili-
tary 
Elections: patrols, advice, 
distribute ballot materi-
als and provide public in-
formation 
OSCE and Council of Europe regularly 
have unarmed civilian election monitors  
Sri Lanka NP with PAFFREL in 2003 in ci-
vilian election monitoring.vi  
OSCE 
EU Monitoring Mis-
sion. 
NP 
Communication: negotiation, collaboration, advocacy 
Negotiate with high level 
military to control troop 
behaviour 
In Sri Lanka and Mindano unarmed civil-
ians directly negotiated with high-level 
military and commanders to change the 
behaviour of troops.vii 
NP 
 
Shuttle diplomacy  In Sri Lanka and Mindanao unarmed ci-
vilian peacekeepers were involved in 
shuttle 
diplomacy – carrying messages between 
groups in order to reduce violence or 
peacefully resolve a dispute.viii 
NP 
 
Collaboration with other 
protection actors 
Collaboration is essential for all protec-
tion wor; there are examples of UCP 
teams 
working with a range of actors including 
UN, state, NGO and other protection ac-
tors. Locations include South Sudan 
working with the Protection Cluster, Sri 
Lanka – informal cooperation with Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission,Georgia work-
ing 
with the EU Monitoring Mission.ix 
NP 
PBI 
Advocacy and human 
rights advice 
The teams in Israel–Palestine and Minda-
nao are examples of where UCP teams 
protect through advocacy on security is-
sues, and provide information and advice 
on human rights.x 
Christian Peace-
makers Team (CPT) 
Ecumenical Accom-
paniment Program 
in Palestine and Is-
rael (EAPPI) 
NP 
PBI 
Negotiate with armed 
groups (child protection) 
UCP teams in Colombia and Sri Lanka 
have examples of direct negotiation with 
armed groups, including preventing child 
abduction and child protection.xi 
NP 
PBI 
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Investigation and responding to findings 
Investigate violations of a 
ceasefire 
In Mindanao UCP had a formal role in in-
vestigations of ceasefire violations. The 
armed actors also confirmed they were 
responsive to the UCP monitors.xii 
NP 
Human Rights monitor-
ing, investigating and 
analysis  
UCP teams in Israel/Palestine and the 
Balkan Peace Team in Croatia and Bosnia 
monitored human rights cases and 
abuses, including reporting and analysis 
provided to other authorities.xiii 
PBI 
Balkan Peace Team 
(BPT) 
Respond to human rights 
violations 
Examples from Guatemala, Colombia and 
the Balkan Peace Team show how UCP 
teams have responded to abuses and vio-
lations of human rights with 
investigations and protection to those af-
fected.xiv 
PBI 
BPT 
NP 
Early warning and early response 
Early warning and early 
response for both vio-
lence and human rights 
In Mindanao, Georgia and Myanmar UCP 
developed a new approach where they 
supported local people learning how to 
recognize early warning signs for vio-
lence 
and know how to respond.xv 
 
NP 
Rumour control Mindanao and Sri Lanka are two exam-
ples where UCP teams have intervened to 
prevent rumours triggering further vio-
lent responses.xvi 
NP 
Peacekeeping tasks not undertaken by AMP 
Provide nonviolent secu-
rity across a conflict zone 
Teams in Mindanao, South Sudan and Co-
lombia provided non-military security 
over 
a wide area. 
In Mindanao in 2011, there were 102 
UCP staff members securing several ar-
eas of 
violent conflict.xvii 
NP 
FoR 
Create weapons free 
zones 
In South Sudan and Colombia UCP have 
supported and enabled local people to 
secure spaces without weapons to im-
prove safety.xviii 
NP 
FoR, CPT, SweFOR, 
PBI 
Capacity development 
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Assist in-country (mili-
tary) personnel with 
training. 
UCP team trains the military in Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, and Human 
Rights.xix 
NP 
Help rebuild the criminal 
justice system 
UCP is not currently involved in this ac-
tivity. 
 
Capacity building. train-
ing in local community 
based protection meth-
ods, healing and trauma, 
and dialogue 
UCP projects in Israel/Palestine, Colom-
bia, and the Balkan Peace Team all 
demonstrate training and capacity build-
ing. Specialist agencies have also 
emerged 
using UCP principles.xx 
BPT 
PBI 
Protection Interna-
tional 
 
 
 
Discussion of the evidence. 
Presence, patrolling, protection, influencing behaviour 
Presence is the task of being visible in areas affected by violence, or where it may occur, and ei-
ther deterring armed actors from using violence, or presenting alternatives to the use of vio-
lence.  Presence is used widely in UCP with examples including Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Colom-
bia, Papua New Guinea83. McCarthy and Pinckney’s research indicated the "necessity of wide, 
consistent, presence" in Palestine.84 In Mindanao, Phillipines, presence is used on a daily basis 
and described as "proactive engagement".85  
 
Examples of patrolling include Sri Lanka where teams spent time visiting remote villages and ar-
eas experiencing tensions; the abduction of children was prevented by  international civilian 
presence at likely places for abductions.  In Colombia, the protection given by UCP is often from 
state violence, or violence tacitly approved by the state.  Presence and patrolling by national and 
international unarmed civilians helped protect peace communities, for example in San Jose de 
Apartado.86 Work in South Sudan included protecting women from rape through proactive pres-
ence and accompaniment.87 
 
UCP interpositioning takes the form of preventing injury, killing and disappearance by directly 
engaging with armed actors and changing their behaviour. Interpositioning has prevented killing 
and disappearance in South Sudan and Colombia.88  There are examples by Mahony and PBI of 
PBI's work in Colombia on how accompaniment includes interpositioning by standing between 
human rights defenders and those who threaten them.89 In Mindanao, UCP tasks included inter-
positioning between armed actors to allow civilians to safely evacuate.90 Kern describes how a 
UCP team stood between a Palestinian youth demonstration and a line of Israeli soldiers ready to 
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fire and as a result, the soldiers lowered their weapons.91   
 
Monitoring, observing, informing 
Monitoring and observing in areas of violent conflict is about making sure agreements are up-
held, looking for triggers of violence, and collecting information on changes in the area that 
might influence a move between peace and violence. UCP works to develop and support commu-
nity ceasefire monitoring as well as monitoring by international peacekeepers.  
 
In Sri Lanka, UCP staff worked with local election monitors from local peace organisations dur-
ing national elections in 2003.92  South Sudan and Georgia are examples of UCP projects that cre-
ated new reporting mechanisms that were linked to existing procedures, to ensure that monitor-
ing revealed events that needed to be reported, and responses were made. In both places there 
were other state run monitoring missions (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and the EU Monitoring 
Mission respectively), but the UCP staff were more accessible to local people. The UCP teams 
were able to sit, for example, with communities who lived near disputed borders, and help them 
discuss the threats they experienced, the fears they lived with, and understand their choices and 
actions in response. This could include telephoning to warn people, knowing who is in command 
and how to contact them, and having safe routes for people to escape if violence flares up.93 In 
Mindanao, as part of the ceasefire and peace process, UCP organisations had the official role of 
monitoring, reporting, and investigating ceasefire agreements.94 
 
Communication: negotiation, collaboration, advocacy 
UCP works through establishing and maintaining strong relationships at all levels and with all 
actors during or after a violent conflict. This is common to all projects and is part of the theoreti-
cal approach by Mahony and Eguren, Furnari, and Schweitzer.95 There is documented evidence 
from Mindanao (Phillipines), South Sudan and Colombia of UCP effectively employing communi-
cation strategies with armed and unarmed actors to protect civilians and reduce levels of vio-
lence. In Sri Lanka, UCP staff carried out shuttle diplomacy between armed actors and local fish-
ermen to create an agreement on having a place where they could safely fish. In Mindanao, as the 
ceasefire was threatened by expiring mandates, the UCP team used shuttle diplomacy between 
the stakeholders (combined with protecting civilians on the ground) to achieve an extension to 
the ceasefire agreements. The relationships that had been established enabled the UCP teams to 
call on senior military and armed group staff to control their troops when threats occurred.96 
 
Like AMP, UCP does not work in isolation; people’s needs interrelate and programme success 
comes from collaboration in integrating expertise and capacities across different organisations.  
Coy has introduced the idea of “cooperative accompaniment”.97  The cooperation not only makes 
UCP more likely to succeed because more organisations are aware of the work and the role of the 
team members, but the team members are more easily able to bring in other expertise to help 
with aspects not covered by UCP. UCP teams collaborate with other protection actors including 
                                                 
91 Kern 2009 
92 Schweitzer 2012 
93 Oldenhuis 2016 
94 Furnari 2016a:147 
95 Mahony and Eguren 1997; Furnari 2014, Schweitzer 2001 
96 Furnari 2016a:150 
97 Coy 1997 
 20 
police and AMP teams. In South Sudan UCP plays a key role in the protection cluster and in build-
ing strong protection mechanisms. In South Sudan and the Philippines, NP cooperates with inter-
national peacekeepers, in Sri Lanka there was informal cooperation with the Sri Lanka Monitor-
ing Mission. In Georgia the UCP team worked with the EU Monitoring Mission, and PBI maintains 
contact with police and other protection actors where they work.  
 
In their role of providing advocacy and human rights advice, UCP teams worked with local hu-
man rights organisations in Sri Lanka. For UCP projects in Israel/Palestine, advocacy is both local 
and international.98  PBI has developed strong relationships both in individual projects and also 
to enable their work and protection of human rights defenders worldwide.99   
In Mindanao work included advocacy on civilian protection with the government and other 
armed actors, and on basic needs with other agencies.100  
Investigation and responding to findings 
In Mindanao, as part of the ceasefire and peace process, UCP had the official role of monitoring, 
reporting and investigating ceasefire agreements.101  Furnari described in detail how the viola-
tions monitoring and reporting was carried out there and gave an example of the work of UCP 
with two armed forces, which were about to attack each other.  UCP personnel talked to both 
sides who were persuaded to stop the attack and leave. The armed actors confirmed they were 
responding to the UCP monitors.102 
 
The focus on human rights monitoring and investigation of abuses is also evidenced through the 
PBI work of protecting human rights defenders.103  In Israel/Palestine, McCartney and Pinckney 
showed how monitoring and documentation were used.104 Human rights investigation is, of 
course, much wider than UCP (for example, the work of Amnesty International or Human Rights 
Watch), but peacekeepers become involved when the human rights actors are threatened or ci-
vilians need direct protection from violence and human rights abuses. 
Early warning and early response.  
Early warning is provided by local people and international peacekeepers working together to 
study the activities of armed actors, or other events, that indicate imminent violence or threat. 
When evidence suggests the threat is significant, for example, if there are new troop movements, 
local people can then respond.  Responses can include reporting, contacting commanders, people 
can hide or flee, or international peacekeepers (armed or unarmed) can be deployed to the area.  
 
In Mindanao, an early warning and response system was set up with many local people trained 
and involved in making it an effective and widespread system.105 There are local examples where 
people set up safe routes or hiding places and informal communication systems, for example hid-
ing in the bush in Sudan when villages are attacked.106 Rumour control is a key task in prevent-
ing violence escalation. To address this issue in Mindanao UCP teams collected information and 
monitored, and communicated with all parties to prevent rumours being used as an excuse for 
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retaliation. In Sri Lanka, UCP staff being present and documenting incidents of violence and hu-
man rights abuses, having good relationships and communicating well, helped to prevent ru-
mours escalating. 
Peacekeeping tasks not undertaken by AMP. 
“Providing security” can take many forms, including making environments safer by removing 
weapons. UCP teams in Mindanao, South Sudan and Colombia have assisted with security and 
influenced the provision of a safer environment. In Mindanao in 2011, there were 102 UCP staff 
across the whole area through eight offices working to make the area safer and increase the se-
curity of civilians.107 There is good evidence that people are safer if there are no weapons. In Co-
lombia, UCP organisations helped villages defend against displacement by refusing to allow 
weapons into the villages and making sure armed actors knew neither the villagers nor unarmed 
protectors were on the side of any of the armed actors.108  Easthom describes how local people 
in South Sudan decided to create a weapons free zone, with the support of UCP teams to investi-
gate any violations.109 The examples of unarmed civilians in South Sudan and Mindanao facing 
local armed actors shows that even where it is feared that local consent is not present, there is 
still no automatic necessity for peacekeepers to be armed. The evidence suggests that unarmed 
civilians without the use or threat of force may be a successful peacekeeping option under these 
circumstances. 
Capacity building 
Capacity building in violent conflict requires working both with armed actors (for example, to 
build responsibility for the protection of civilians) and also local communities, leaders and local 
government. By developing good relationships with all actors, UCP is able to work on human 
rights training or alternative strategies which reduce the violence towards civilians. Mindanao is 
a particularly good example as some of the military leaders in Mindanao promoted unarmed ci-
vilians taking on the work of patrol, investigation and reporting.  The UCP team in Mindanao 
trained military personnel in International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights.110  
 
Capacity building by UCP also includes training in local community based protection methods, 
healing and trauma, and dialogue. The trainings come after the relationship building has begun, 
when local people or partners, or even armed actors, want to increase the effectiveness of their 
protection work. This can include learning new models of protection and visiting other projects 
to share experiences, or how to reduce the barriers (such as recognising and dealing with 
trauma), or practicing skills in different circumstances such as shuttle diplomacy and opening 
conversations as an intervention strategy. In Israel/Palestine, McCarthy and Pinckney reported 
that interviewees saw this as essential to the effectiveness of UCP.111  The Balkan Peace Team 
also undertook capacity building with communities and organisations, and Peace Brigades Inter-
national works with local organisations to develop capacity to enable them to work on peace and 
human rights in their local communities in the long term112. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The condition that peacekeeping requires military personnel and weapons is an assumption that 
is not supported by the evidence from the field. The evidence in Table 1 shows that in different 
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projects, unarmed civilians are successfully carrying out the tasks of peacekeeping, protecting 
civilians and preventing and reducing violence. It shows that the term ‘peacekeeping’ can refer 
to more than the use of armed military personnel, it can include unarmed civilians being the 
‘peacekeepers’. 
 
The assumption that an armed actor will not yield to anything except a weapon has been demon-
strated to be false on many occasions.  
 
The evidence from 35 years of UCP shows that peacekeeping can be done without military or 
other uniformed personnel who carry weapons and that the use of UCP can reduce the negative 
impacts that are brought by the use of armed military personnel. 
 
The lack of study and debate of UCP within peacekeeping studies has limited the options for 
peacekeeping and it is time to address this issue.  While there is plenty of evidence that UCP 
works where it has been studied, too often the assumption that UCP has nothing to offer means 
that it is not fully included in the options that are considered, and this has led to an incomplete 
understanding of what makes peacekeeping effective, and a partial understanding of how peace-
keeping works.   
 
In the same way that other fields such as humanitarian action, peacebuilding, and demining have 
developed new thinking and new approaches over the last three decades, peacekeeping needs 
new approaches. In peacekeeping too many actors are tied to a single response, defined by in-
puts and activities instead of outcomes and impacts, and this has locked actors into only one re-
sponse: peacekeeping delivered by armed military (or other uniformed) systems and organisa-
tions.  The reason that AMP dominates is not because it has been shown to produce better re-
sults, but because it is too often assumed that there is simply no alternative.  As a result UCP is 
insufficiently resourced, which leads to a cycle of even fewer resources. While there are clear 
reasons that many people find UCP an unlikely success story, this response cannot remain un-
challenged in the face of evidence of the success and utility of UCP.  The paradoxical nature of 
confronting violence with unarmed civilians may not always be a disadvantage after all; it may 
help to unlock some complex and intractable situations and it addresses the disadvantages of us-
ing military in peacekeeping.  One of the greatest challenges for UCP is widespread prejudice that 
‘it can't possibly work’. 
 
The blurring of boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement does not benefit those 
in need of support to reduce the violence they face, but rather benefits the established military 
paradigm. By separating the activities of peace enforcement and peacekeeping, and maintaining 
a focus on peacekeeping as a distinct activity, this paper has presented evidence that there is an-
other way to reduce violence, prevent the spread of war and support ceasefires, by working with 
unarmed civilians. 
 
There are many areas that require further research, for example the changing humanitarian 
landscape where attacks on humanitarian workers are increasing requires better understanding 
of the differences between humanitarian aid workers and unarmed civilian peacekeepers, in-
cluding how they work and how they are perceived. We need to understand the structures 
within which UCP operates and continue Coy's work on the privilege used by peacekeepers.  It is 
clear that we need to understand more about the costs and limitations for all types of peacekeep-
ing.  
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In contrast to authors113 who suggest that robust or cosmopolitan peacekeeping is an appropri-
ate response to the increasing complexity and weaknesses of peacekeeping operations in in-
creasingly complex situations, UCP offers a different view that increasing militarisation, hostility 
and use of force will limit our ability to respond. A nonviolent, locally based and democratic 
peacekeeping option will compensate for some of the disadvantages of AMP and truly provide 
more space for imaginative responses. 
 
By challenging the assumption that peacekeeping is primarily based on military personnel with 
weapons, we can create better options in peacekeeping so that our analysis of what is needed 
can draw on a wider range of evidence-based responses, including civilian run peacekeeping op-
erations with no reliance on the military or weapons. 
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